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Due Process and Foreign Corporations -
The Minnesota Single Act Statute
Due process limitations upon the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations are rapidly declin-
ing. The author of this Note examines the trend within
the framework of the Minnesota Single Act Statute. De-
cisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the United States
Supreme Court are considered. He concludes that while
some due process requirements will persevere, they may
lose nearly all significance in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
If an action is brought against a corporation organized in a
state other than Minnesota, in certain circumstances the plaintiff
may have the option to use a Minnesota forum. The availability
of this option depends upon whether Minnesota courts have juris-
diction to render a binding personal judgment against the
"foreign" corporation. Such in personam jurisdiction exists only
if service of process upon the defendant corporation does not
violate its rights under federal due process.
The demands of jurisdictional due process have undergone a
substantial transformation; restrictiveness has been supplanted by
an uncertain permissiveness. Although the requirement that the
defendant have a sufficiently substantial relationship with the
forum state still remains, the nature of this relationship has been
fundamentally altered. The United States Supreme Court origi-
nally required physical presence within the forum state to justify
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.' The Court next used
various jurisdictional tests which stressed the quantity of activi-
ties within the forum state2 In International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. Prior to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), a
corporation doing business within a state was amenable to jurisdiction upon
a theory of consent, Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856),
or upon a theory of corporate presence, International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Application of either theory depended primarily
upon evidence that a corporation was "doing business" within the forum state.
This requirement was a quantitative measure of a corporation's activities
within the forum and, generally, was not satisfied by isolated transactions,
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1928).
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ington,3 however, the Court substituted a qualitative test of
"minimum contacts."4 Since International Shoe the minimum con-
tacts principle has been given significant application. Jurisdiction
has been upheld on the basis of a single insurance contract having
a "substantial connection" with the forum state, although no acts
were performed within that state. Presumably the "quality and
nature" of the single contract was such as to satisfy the minimum
contacts principle. However, the Court in a later case added an
element of confusion to the area by denying jurisdiction where the
defendant had carried on no activities in the forum state0
The uncertain requirement of minimum contacts has prompted
a number of states to enact "single act" statutes.7 Because of the
wide variations in the provisions of these statutes, this Note will
focus on the Minnesota Single Act Statute Under the Minnesota
statute jurisdiction is obtained over a foreign corporation through
substituted service0 in actions resulting from either of two circum-
3. 326 U.S. 810 (1945).
4. See generally Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of
Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 522; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process
Clause and thw In Persona= Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv.
569 (1958); Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 909 (1958); 2 BOSTON COLLE4GE INDUSTRIL
& CommEAcL L. REv. 389 (1961).
5. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 20 (1957).
6. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
7. See, e.g., CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (1960); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 617.8 (Supp. 1964). For commentaries upon the Minnesota Single Act Statute,
see Note, 42 MINN. L. Rzv. 909 (1958); 48 MIN. L. REv. 187 (1963); 45
MINN. L. REv. 127 (1960).
8. MnNN. STAT. § 303.13(1)(3) (1961) provides:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minne-
sota to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota,
or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in
Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed
to be doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation and shall
be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the foreign corporation
of the secretary of the State of Minnesota and his successors to be its
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in
any actions or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from
or growing out of such contract or tort.
9. A question arises as to whether it is a violation of the privileges and
immunities clause to allow service upon a statutory agent of a nonresident
defendant, when service upon resident defendants must be personal. In Minne-
sota, service is to be personal unless a statute provides for substituted service
upon a state official. Mnmr. R. DIST. CT. (Civ.) 4.03; MnN. R. MuNic. CT.
(Civ.) 4.03. The privileges and immunities clause, however, does not apply to
corporations since they are not citizens for purposes of that clause. E.g.,
Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945); Grosjean v. American
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stances: (1) the corporation and a Minnesota resident are parties
to a contract to be performed at least partially by either party in
Minnesota; or (9) the corporation commits a tort in whole or in
part in Minnesota against a Minnesota resident. 0
This Note shall attempt to predict the extent to which the
Minnesota statute may be constitutionally applied, based upon
the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the United States Supreme
Court. The constitutionality of the minimum requirements enunci-
ated by the Minnesota court and the Eighth Circuit will be evalu-
ated against standards established by the Supreme Court. A
possible logical culmination of the trend toward expanded state
jurisdiction under due process will also be considered. Finally, the
requirements of the Supreme Court will be evaluated in terms of
the probable minimum demands of due process.
H. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
The Minnesota Supreme Court has given several opinions on
the due process question under the Single Act Statute.n However,
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). Therefore, under the privileges and immunities
clause there is no question as to the validity of the statute.
10. Limiting the availability of the statute to resident plaintiffs arguably
violates the privileges and immunities or the equal protection clause. This
question may have no bearing on the contract provision of the statute be-
cause, in applying that provision to a nonresident plaintiff, the federal district
court has held that there is no statutory requirement that the plaintiff be a
resident of Minnesota. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn.
1964); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962).
In Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 2.79 U.S. 377, 387 (1929), the
Supreme Court stated:
A distinction of privileges according to residence may be based upon
rational considerations and has been upheld -by this Court, emphasizing
the difference between citizenship and residence.... There are manifest
reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded Courts,
both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is they who
pay for maintaining the Courts concerned.
This opinion may be construed as providing two decisive reasons why the tort
provisions of the Minnesota Single Act Statute would not violate the privi-
leges and immunities clause: The statute distinguishes between "residents"
and "nonresidents," not "citizens" and "noncitizens"; and second, the distinc-
tion is reasonable. The same result would follow under the equal protection
clause because the standard is reasonableness of the classification upon which
differentiated treatment is founded. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); see,
e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 461 (1948).
11. For decisions upon the due process issue under related Minnesota
statutes, see Casperson v. Board of Regents, 137 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. 1965)
(Mm. STAT. § 540.152 (1961)); Danov v. ABC Freight Forwarding Corp.,
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different applications of the statute have been made depending on
the nature of the cause of action.
A. ToRT ACTIONS
The application of the statute to a corporate defendant which
had never conducted activities in Minnesota has been held con-
stitutional.12 In the opinion of the court the statute does not
violate due process when applied to a tort committed in whole
or in part in Minnesota. If injury occurs within the state, the
tort is committed "in part" in Minnesota."3 The statutory objec-
tive "to permit a 1innesota citizen injured here by the wrongful
act of a foreign corporation to seek recompense therefor in our
courts"'1 4 is thought to outweigh the interest in protecting the
foreign corporation from the burdens of defending in a forum
which possibly may be inconvenient' 3
266 Minn. 115, 122 N.W.2d 776 (1963) (same); Brooks v. International Bhd.
of Boilermakers, 262 Minn. 253, 114 N.W.2d 647 (1962) (same); Paulos v.
Best Sec., Inc., 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961) (Mumx . STAT. § 80.14(1)
(1961)). Alum. STAT. § 540.152 (1961) confers jurisdiction over labor unions
and other partnerships; Mn-x. STAT. § 80.14(1) (1961) provides jurisdiction
over sellers of securities. In Danov and Paulos, jurisdiction over individual
defendants was upheld on the basis of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957). In Brooks, the constitutional question was said to be
essentially the same as under the Single Act Statute.
Thus the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently applied these statutes
to partnerships and individuals upon the basis of the International Shoe
rationale. The differences among corporations, partnerships, and individuals
as entities are differences without a distinction in terms of the International
Shoe rationale. That rationale should apply equally to all entities, since it is
based upon contacts with a state founded upon economic activity which can
be carried on by an individual or partnership, as well as a corporation. Thus,
it would appear that the Minnesota court's treatment of individuals and
partnerships is basically sound. Arguments for the application of the Inter-
national Shoe rationale to individuals and partnerships are advanced in detail
in Note, 42 Mwrr. L. Rv. 909 (1958). For an extensive treatment of state
court jurisdiction, see Developmentv in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
12. Ehiers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56,
124 N.W.2d 824 (1968); Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108
N.W.2d 607 (1961); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571,
104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
13. See cases cited note 12 supra. But see Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209
F. Supp. 571 (N.D.W. Va. 1962) (alternative holding).
14. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 580, 104
N.W.Rd 888, 894 (1960).
15. One of the positions taken by the federal district court for Minnesota
has been that it is a denial of due process to apply the Single Act Statute to a
defendant whose only contact with Minnesota is that his product causes
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It is clear that the court will apply the statute to a defendant
who has not directly introduced a product into Minnesota by sell-
ing either to a local resident or local wholesaler. Jurisdiction was
upheld in Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp.,"n
even though the defendant manufacturer was at least twice-
removed from any Minnesota sale. 17 It is not clear, however,
whether the mere presence of the product in Minnesota would
provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. For example, a con-
ceptual difficulty arises if a Minnesota resident on a trip pur-
chases a defective product from a New York manufacturer which
later causes damage in Minnesota. Since the court in Ehlers
damage to a resident in Minnesota. Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prods.
Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961); Mueller v. Steelease, Inc., 172
F. Supp. 416 (D. Mnn. 1959); accord, Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209
F. Supp. 571 (N.D.W. Va. 1962); of. Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950). But see note 43 infra.
16. 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963). In Ehlers the corporate de-
dendants in two of the original actions effected removal to the federal district
court. Even though the petition for removal on its face evidenced a lack of
complete diversity of citizenship, the federal court quashed service of process
upon the defendants. 267 Minn. at 58, 124 N.W.2d at 825. However, in sub-
sequent state actions the individual defendant instituted a third party action
against his local supplier. Since the supplier was not a party to the federal
court proceedings and was not affected by its ruling, he was able to bring
third party proceedings against one of the corporate defendants upon which
process had been quashed in the federal court. This series of events illustrates
a possibility of serious injustice. If an action is before a federal court under
alleged diversity jurisdiction, and the diversity question does not raise novel
constitutional issues, that question should be determined before any question
concerning personal judisdiction. If the diversity question is not determined,
and if diversity in fact does not exist, the judgment on personal jurisdiction
will have been made by a court lacking competence to decide the question.
While such decision would be open to attack on direct review, it would gen-
erally be res judicata in a subsequent state action on the same issue between
the same parties. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
S08 U.S. 371, 877 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1935);
Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 340 (1894); RESTATE MNT, JUDGANTS § 10
(1942). The parties would be precluded from collaterally attacking the di-
versity jurisdiction of the federal court notwithstanding their failure to
litigate that issue in the federal court. See United States v. Eastport
S.S. Co., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958). Moreover, it would seem that the federal
court should avoid an interpretation of or an attack on the state statute
where such disposition is dearly unnecessary. See Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodeaux, 860 U.S. 25 (1959). To the extent that this has
happened, or may happen, the offending federal courts can be justly criticized.
17. The defendant in Ehlers sold the product in Ohio to an Ohio corpora-
tion which sold the product to an Illinois corporation. The Illinois corporation
sold to a Minnesota corporation which sold to plaintiff.
SINGLE ACT
makes reference to the defendant's reasonable anticipation that
one of its products could reach Minnesota in the "regular course
of distribution,"' 8 it appears probable that some foreseeability
of a Minnesota market remains as a minimum requirement. How-
ever, it need not be foreseeable that the particular product causing
damage would be sold in Minnesota 9 It has been suggested a
single act statute cannot be constitutionally applied to isolated
sales; the product must have substantial use and consumption in
the forum stateY Ehlers suggests that for jurisdiction to attach
it may be sufficient if the defendant has a reasonable expectation
of a national market which does not specifically exclude Minne-
sota. 1 Thus, in order to find liability, the Minnesota Supreme
Court will not require the actual performance of a tortious act
in Minnesota by the defendant. Nor will it require that a de-
fendant must have sold its products specifically to Minnesota
residents if the defendant could reasonably have anticipated that
even one of its products might ultimately have reached a Minne-
sota purchaser and caused injury in that state.
B. CONTRACT ACTIONS
It appears to be a requirement in contract actions that the
defendant must have conducted activities within Minnesota. The
nature of the requisite activity may vary, however, depending on
whether the resident plaintiff is a purchaser or a seller.
Arguably, Minnesota exercises jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations to protect residents from faulty products that might be
sold for local consumption. The size of the claim and the limita-
tion on an individual's resources might make it impossible to
18. 267 Minn. at 61-62, 124 N.W.2d at 827. The court relied on Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 4s2, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). Gray found it just to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation which
elects to sell its products for use in another state when damages are caused
in that state. This conclusion was based upon the Illinois court's conception
of modem commercial activity.
19. See Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn.
56, 61-62, 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963).
20. Erlanger AM v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 505 (4th Cir.
1956); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 407 P.2d 948, 951 (Ariz. 1965);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d
568 (1963).
21. 267 Mfin. at 61, 124 N.W.2d at 827.
22. See Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 580, 104
N.W.2d 888, 894 (1960); 48 Minm. L. Ruv. 192, 193 (1963).
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bring this pseudocontractual claim elsewhere. 8 The purchaser in
Beck v. Spindler 4 recovered for breach of a contractual warranty.
Although the nonresident seller in Beck had performed acts in
Minnesota, jurisdiction might have been upheld even absent such
acts. At least in the area of products liability, there is no logical
reason to require local acts to sustain a warranty action, and not
to require local acts in a negligence action.2 5 Both theories would
be available in the typical products liability case.
When suit is brought by a Minnesota purchaser against a
foreign seller for breach of an executory bilateral contract it is not
clear whether jurisdiction would depend on the presence of local
acts. The Beck court indicated that the statute would be applied
to a foreign corporation irrespective of the lack of multiple local
transactions.F8 Jurisdiction in Beck was not explicitly limited to
products liability; the broad language of the opinion supports the
opposite conclusion.27 Arguably, the policy of providing a local
forum for claims that a resident may not economically bring else-
where applies to the executory bilateral contract. Even if local
acts are unnecessary, however, it appears that some sales activity
in Minnesota would still be required. When the plaintiff is a
residential seller, however, the protective policy underlying the
statute has little application.
The tendency to require less sales activity to bring a foreign
corporation within the statute has not been accompanied by any
parallel lessening of the requirements as to purchasing activities. 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court determined in Dahlberg Co. v.
Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd.,2 9 that the statute could con-
stitutionally be applied against a nonresident buyer in a suit by a
resident corporate seller. The Dahlberg defendant, however, had
substantial contacts with Minnesota: The contract was executed
23. Cf. Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hlson Indus., Inc., 264 Mun.
110, 115, 117 N.W2d 732, 735 (1962).
24. 256 Minn. 548, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
25. Although the Minnesota court has not had occasion to determine
whether privity is required to sustain an action for breach of warranty, dictum
in Beck v. Spindler, 256 AMnn. 543, 557-62, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682 (1959), sug-
gests that the privity requirement will be dropped when the question is
directly presented. See also Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 54,2 (D.
Mnn. 1964). Warranty without privity is a doctrine of strict tort liability
rather than contract.
26. 256 Minn. at 558, 99 N.W.2d at 677.
27. "It seems only fair to permit one who has suffered a wrong at the hands
of a resident of a foreign state to sue in his own state.. ." Ibid.
28. See 48 Muin. L. Rzv. 192, 194 (1963).
29. 259 imn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381 (1961).
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in Minnesota; notes were executed and delivered in Minnesota;
and several meetings between the parties were held in Minnesota.
Since the court in Dahlberg specifically limited its holding to the
facts,30 it appears that the activities of a nonresident buyer must
be at least as substantial as those of Dahlberg before the statute
may be constitutionally applied. Moreover, since the defendant in
Dahlberg had performed rather substantial acts in the state, it
would seem that acts in Minnesota would be required for any
action against a nonresident purchaser.
It also appears that these activities must be such as to give
rise to enjoyment of the benefits of Minnesota laws and access
to Minnesota courts.3 In Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v.
Hilson Indus., Inc.2 the defendant nonresident buyer had neither
performed acts nor advertised in Minnesota. The only contacts
with the state were the initial solicitation and the place of pay-
ment. The court, applying Dahlberg, held that subjecting the non-
resident buyer to suit in the state forum violated due process.
While the defendant in Dahlberg had performed acts within the
state and had enjoyed the benefit of its law,3 the defendant in
Hilson engaged in no parallel activity. There appears to be good
reason to require substantial activity of a nonresident buyer be-
fore invoking the Single Act Statute; an exercise of jurisdiction
over casual nonresident buyers could dissuade customers from
doing business across state lines.34 Moreover, a resident corporate
seller, sophisticated in business dealings, could both foresee and
sustain the burden of a foreign suit.
In both Dahlberg and Hilson reference is made to the factor
of convenience. Whether convenience is viewed as an additional
requirement of due process, however, is not clear;35 it well may be
30. Id. at 335, 107 N.W.2d at 884.
31. See id. at 836-37, 107 N.W.ad at 385.
32. 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
33. Id. at 116, 117 N.W.2d at 735-36.
34. See id. at 117, 117 N.W.2d at 736; Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250,
255, 342 P.2d 871, 875 (1959); 48 Mmnix. L. ItEv. 192, 194 (1963).
35. Some authorities feel that inconvenience does not pose a constitutional
question. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1964); Pend-
zimas v. Eastern letal Prods. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961); Foster,
Personal Juri3sdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 522;
Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed to Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State
Defendants, 48 A.B.AJ. 725 (1962); see Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166
F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948); Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240
F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1965). Others indicate the opposite is true. Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Schutt v. Commercial
Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 229 F.d 158 (2d Cir. 1956); Pugh v.
Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1958);
1966]
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only a reaffirmance of the doctrine of forum non conveniens50 It
has been suggested that the factors underlying the doctrine are
also the primary determinants of the due process issue 7 The
doctrine serves both public38 and private 9 purposes. Clearly
considerations of public convenience are not within the word "in-
convenience" as used in the context of due process by either the
United States Supreme Court,40 or the Minnesota Supreme Court.
41
Hence, use of the term forum non conveniens to refer only to
inconvenience caused a defendant is highly misleading. It would
be more accurate to say merely that some of the same private
interest factors which underly the doctrine will be reflected in the
constitutional determination of minimum contacts sufficient for
due process. Since due process may be consistent with greater in-
convenience than would support a determination of forum non
conveniens, it is suggested that the court should weigh private
interest factors differently when determining constitutional
validity than when merely deciding whether to dismiss as a matter
of discretion.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 482, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Andersen v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639
(Iowa 1965).
36. In Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763
(1954), the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly adopted the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. That holding has been followed in subsequent decisions.
Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 89 N.W.2d 654 (1958);
Ramsey v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 247 Minn. 217, 77 N.W.2d 176 (1956).
37. Latimer v. S/A Industrias Iteunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d
Cir. 1949); Klpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1948);
see 1 EMHENZWEIG, CONFLICT or LAWS § 85, at 121 (1959); Traynor, Is This
Conflict ReallUy Necessary?, 87 TEXAS L. Rlv. 657, 663-64 (1959).
88. The factors of public interest in applying forum non conveniens include
administrative difficulties resulting from congested court calendars, the local
interest in having local controversies decided at home, imposition of jury
duty on the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation,
and the desirability of litigating in a forum that is familiar with the applicable
state law. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 380 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
89. The private considerations involved in the application of forum non
conveniens include the relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtain-
ing attendance of witnesses, the possibility of viewing the premises, if appro-
priate, and the ability to enforce any judgment obtained. See Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, supra note 38, at 508 (1947).
40. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 826 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
41. Fourth Northwestern Natl Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110,
118-19, 117 N.W.2d 732, 737 (1962); Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid
Center Ltd., 259 Minn. 330, 337, 107 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1961).
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I. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.,' a tort action, is the only
decision in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
considered the due process question under the statute.43 The de-
fendant seller had performed substantial acts in Minnesota."
While the full extent of the statute's permissible application was
not tested,43 the weight accorded by the court to the criteria it
42. 348 Fad 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
43. Prior to Aftanase, the federal district court for Minnesota had applied
three conflicting viewpoints to the question of due process under the statute.
Since these cases are all recent, predictability of result has been virtually
impossible. However, it is quite likely and desirable that Aftanase will clear
up the difficulty. Upon this assumption the viewpoints of the district court
need only be mentioned.
The first approach, although it recognized that an isolated act could be
sufficient for due process, required that an aclt be performed by the defendant
in Minnesota. See, e.g., Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prods. Corp., 218 F. Supp.
524 (D. Minn. 1961); Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn.
1959).
The second approach required only an injury in Minnesota to a Minnesota
resident for due process to have been satisfied. See Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons
Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960); McMenomy v. Wonder
Building Corp. of America, 188 F. Supp. 218 (D. Minn. 1960). But see Ewing
v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962).
The third approach required only that the defendant placed its products
in the "stream of national commerce." Haldeman-Homme Mfg. Co. v. Texacon
Indus., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mrum. 1964); Williams v. Connolly, 227 F.
Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964) (dictum); see Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery,
Inc., 240 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1965); compare Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
44. Defendant had sold balers to Minnesota residents for a number of years.
Solicitation was carried on by independent salesmen on a commission basis. One
of the salesmen obtained orders for three or four balers a year, and he was not
the only solicitor for defendant within the state. The contracts were con-
cluded in Michigan and defendant shipped the balers directly to Minnesota
customers. Brochures and parts lists were sent into the state, and replacement
parts were supplied.
45. Aftanase also considered retroactive application of the statute. The
alleged negligent act occurred in 1953 when the baler was manufactured. The
statute became effective in 1957. Plaintiff was injured in 1962. Relying on
Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959), the court stated that
the statute was applied prospectively because the cause of action accrued
after the statute was in effect. 343 Fed at 191.
The constitutional prohibition of retroactive legislation is based upon the
frustration of the expectations of persons acting in reliance upon prior law.
Note, 63 CoLrnr. L. REv. 1105 (1963). Under this rationale the application of
the statute to the defendant in Aftanase would be retroactive, but would not
be unconstitutional. Retroactive application is unconstitutional when it de-
1966]
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used affords some basis for prediction. After analysis of the major
United States Supreme Court decisions,46 the Eighth Circuit found
five factors that the Court has used in deciding the due process
question: Interest of the state in providing a forum, convenience
to the parties, quantity of contacts with the forum, relation of the
cause of action to the contacts, and the nature and quality of the
contacts.
The interest of the forum state in hearing the cause of action
and convenience to the parties merely "receive mention.' 4r The
implication is that such an interest is always present, but insuffi-
cient to have a substantial effect on the due process question. The
summary treatment given to the convenience of the parties in
Aftanase is evidence that this factor will not be determinative of
the due process question.
The quantity, their connection with the cause of action, and
nature and quality of the defendant's contacts with the forum
were the three primary factors stressed in Aftanase. With regard
to the quantity of contacts, the court equivocally stated that the
defendant's sales to Minnesota residents were "not insignificant."
These contacts, primarily sales, were not continuous and sys-
tematic, but they were not isolated exceptions to the defendant's
pattern of doing business. The court explicitly recognized that a
single contract had been sufficient quantitative contact to satisfy
stroys or impairs a vested right or creates a new obligation, a new duty, or a
new disability. See Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885); Nelson v.
Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). Since there is no vested right in
an existing remedy or mode of procedure, Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh,
187 U.S. 437 (1903), a remedial or procedural statute, such as the Single Act
Statute, may be applied retroactively. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
However, M In. STAT. 9 645.21 (1961) provides: "No law shall be con-
strued to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the
legislature." This statute has been held to apply to laws relating to procedure.
Ekstrom v. Harmon, 256 Minn. 166, 98 N.W.2d 241 (1959); Chapman v.
Davis, 233 Minn. 62,45 N.W.2d 822 (1951). Since there was no clear indication
of legislative intent to apply the Single Act Statute retroactively, under the
expectation theory that statute should not have been applied in Aftanase. The
court correctly declined to consider the effect of § 645.21 because the question
of its application was not squarely presented. However, the court's failure to
consider the ramifications of the expectation theory did not accord the retro-
activity question the careful analysis and direct confrontation it deserved.
46. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 8326 U.S. 310 (1945).
47. 348 F.2d at 197.
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the Supreme Court.48 Therefore, it can be inferred that the Eighth
Circuit would not hold the quantity of contacts to be determi-
native of the due process question, if the other factors were
satisfied.
Connection of the cause of action with the defendant's con-
tacts is automatically satisfied by the terms of the statute. Since
the statute confers jurisdiction only in actions growing out of the
contract or tort which provides the contact,49 that factor must
be present for the statute to apply at all. The Eighth Circuit
seems to have recognized this fact by implication.50
Thus, the extent to which the Eighth Circuit may be willing to
apply the statute probably depends almost exclusively upon the
nature and quality of the defendant's contacts with Minnesota,
which in turn depend upon three interrelated questions. Must
the defendant, through agents or otherwise, conduct any activities
involving performance of acts within Minnesota? Must the defend-
ant actively pursue economic benefit through transactions with
Minnesota residents? Must the contacts involve substantial eco-
nomic transactions?
The court's analysis of the nature and quality of the defend-
ant's contacts indicates that the defendant need not perform any
acts within Minnesota; but the defendant must actively pursue
substantial economic benefit through a transaction with a Minne-
sota resident. The defendant in Aftanase actively solicited sales
and knowingly shipped its products directly into Minnesota. Thus,
the defendant purposely and voluntarily placed its products on
the state market and was benefited therefrom. The defendant's
transactions received the protection of Minnesota laws. The
products in question, metal baling machines with a useful life of
thirty years, were substantial devices. The court did not emphasize
the acts of the independent solicitors on behalf of the defendant
within Minnesota when it applied the "nature and quality of the
contacts" standard to the facts. Instead, the court concluded that
48. Id. at 196.
49. See Nfnw. STAT. § 303.18(1), (8) (1961).
50. The court recognized a state may impose limitations upon its jurisdic-
tion beyond those required by due process. It further acknowledged that these
limitations must be observed by federal courts. 343 F.2d at 190-91. Since
the statute requires causal connection, and since the Supreme Court held, in
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), that there can
be activities substantial enough to permit jurisdiction where this causal con-
nection is absent, this requirement is a limitation beyond those of due process.
The court undoubtedly was aware of the fact that the requirement of casual
connection of contacts with the cause of action is merely statutory in nature.
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the defendant conducted "voluntary, affirmative economic ac-
tivity of substance."51
Hence, it appears that the Eighth Circuit would apply the
statute to a tort action even when the defendant had performed no
acts in Minnesota. However, the defendant would be required to
have voluntarily and affirmatively sought Minnesota customers
in transactions from which it would derive substantial economic
benefit. The court's emphasis upon the defendant's affirmative and
knowledgeable dealings with Minnesota residents would seem to
imply that the statute would not be applied to a defendant which
placed its products in the stream of interstate commerce with
mere knowledge that its products might find their way into the
state. 2 The substantial economic benefit could probably be satis-
fied by one or many transactions. The benefit would be the same
whether the defendant sold one taconite plant or one million
watchbands. The extent of the minimum benefit which must be
sought by the defendant to sustain jurisdiction remains undefined.
Although the Eighth Circuit has not as yet considered the due
process question under the statute in a contract action, the same
considerations as in a tort action probably apply. However, fol-
lowing the Minnesota Supreme Court,"' the Eighth Circuit would
probably not apply the statute to a foreign corporate buyer which
had not actively sought the transaction.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE
STATUTE AS APPLIED BY THE MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The extent to which the United States Supreme Court would
uphold jurisdiction under the statute depends primarily upon its
interpretation of the minimum contacts requirement of Inter-
national Shoe. This analysis will focus on the question of whether
due process demands performance of acts within Minnesota. No
distinction will be made between tort and contract actions; the
Court has never suggested that such a distinction is relevant.
51. 343 F2d at 197. Although this conclusion could be taken to apply only
to the activities of the defendant's solicitors, it is equally pertinent to the
totality of the defendant's contacts.
52. But see Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964); Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 482, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
53. See Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn.
110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
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A. McGEE v. INTNATiONAL Lumi INS. Co.
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co." the Supreme Court
upheld jurisdiction by substituted service upon a corporate de-
fendant which had performed no acts in the forum state. The
defendant had solicited a reinsurance contract by mail with a
California resident, and the insured had mailed premiums from
that state. The defendant had no office or agent in California, nor
had it solicited or transacted any other business there. An analysis
of the Court's language in McGee suggests that the decision
rested only on the substantial connection of the reinsurance con-
tract with the state. The Court stated: 'It is sufficient for pur-
poses of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with that State."'5 5 The Court did not
require the defendant to have performed acts within the forum.
The Court also considered the inconvenience which would re-
sult to the corporation."( Although the defendant would be incon-
venienced by a suit in California, it would be "nothing which
amounts to a denial of due process. ' ' 57 Thus, it could be said that
inconvenience to the defendant probably will never be a denial
of due processY8
The Court also considered California's "manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims."59 The statement implies that a state
has a substantial jurisdictional interest at least in such regulated
activities as insurance. While it has been suggested that the refer-
ence to insurance is an important limitation of McGee, 0 this
54. 855 U.S. 220 (1957).
55. Id. at 223.
56. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
57. 855 U.S. at 224.
58. "At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity." Id. at 223. See also text accompanying
notes 35-41 supra.
59. 355 U.S. at 228.
60.
This test [of International Shoe] is not rigid, and less contact will
be required where a state has a substantial interest which out-
weighs the defendant's interest in not being subjected to jurisdiction.
Naturally, the best indication of this state interest is in a special
statute regulating the defendant's activities and granting jurisdiction
to the courts.
43 MIwN. L. R v. 569, 576 (1959); accord, Comment, 14 RuGERs L. REV. 454
(1960); Comment, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 63 (1962). The Seventh Circuit was more
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conclusion has not been universally accepted.6' It appears, how-
ever, that the Court itself might not have considered a "manifest
interest" crucial. Since the Court held that due process was satis-
fied solely on the basis of the connection of the contract with the
forum state, California's manifest interest is arguably irrelevant.
There is strong state interest in providing a forum for local resi-
dents, irrespective of the cause of injury. Moreover, regulation of
insurance companies seems to be designed to prevent litigation -
not to protect residents from being forced to sue in another state.
Since jurisdiction could also be obtained over an insurance com-
pany through a general single act statute, regulation of economic
activities adds nothing to a state's interest in providing a forum
for its residents. Nevertheless, the Court in Hanson v. Denckla2
subsequently distinguished McGee partially because the manifest
interest present in McGee was absent.63 Whether the Court will
explicitly incorporate manifest state interest into the due process
standard is not clear.
B. T M VALIDITY OF MINNESOTA SUPREVE COURT AND EIGHTH
CIRCUIT DECIsIONS UNDER McGee
Neither McGee nor the Minnesota Supreme Court would re-
quire performance of acts in Minnesota in tort actions. Whether
the requirements of the two rationales are consistent, therefore,
depends upon whether a reasonable expectation that products
may reach Minnesota provides the necessary "substantial connec-
tion" with that state. The contract in McGee was delivered in the
forum state, the premiums were mailed from there, and the in-
sured was a resident of the forum. The products of a manufacturer
whose potential market includes Minnesota would be delivered in
the state, payment would presumably be made there, and the in-
emphatic. "However, we think the more recent case of Hanson v. Denclda...
demonstrates the McGee case has been limited by the Court to the insurance
field." Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir.
1959).
61. Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D.
Minn. 1965), stated that McGee was "clearly controlling unless the fact that
an insurance contract was involved is sufficient to distinguish it." That dis-
tinction was not made. Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 848 F. 2d 861,
868 (5th Cir. 1965) stated that the substantial state interest of McGee con-
sisted generally of providing a forum for redress of tortious injuries even if
they do not arise from dangerous activities. From this it can be inferred that
such an interest would be present in all cases. If this is the case, such an
interest is actually irrelevant to a due process standard.
62. 857 U.S. 235 (1958).
68. Id. at 25,2.
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jured party would be a local resident. If the manufacturer dealt
directly with a resident of the forum, as in McGee, the substantial
connection would probably exist. If the product were only indi-
rectly sold to a resident, however, delivery and payment would
be transactions between the resident and a third party. The manu-
facturer probably would not even be aware of the ultimate sale
in the state. The connection with Minnesota would be even more
tenuous than was the connection with California in McGee.
Similar difficulties would be presented if suit were brought on a
warranty theory and the product had initially been sold outside
of the forum to an independent dealer.
In true contract actions the minimum requirements of the
lMnnesota Supreme Court satisfy McGee. The Minnesota court's
requirement of "activity" through transactions with residents
would undoubtedly provide the substantial connection. It is possi-
ble, however, that this requirement is even more stringent than
that required by McGee. Although the Minnesota court in Hilson
found a violation of due process when the defendant was merely a
corporate purchaser, jurisdiction could well have been upheld
under the McGee rationale since payment was to be made and the
plaintiff resided in the state. However, the Hilson defendant did
not actively seek the transaction and the McGee defendant did.
In addition, the Minnesota court probably would require more
than McGee in true contract actions against nonresident sellers
by requiring acts performed in the state. Finally, the Minnesota
court follows McGee in its willingness to consider the factor of
convenience. Whether convenience is a constitutional requirement,
however, is not clear.
The Eighth Circuit, on the basis of Aftanase, would not require
the performance of acts by a defendant in Minnesota. But it
would require active pursuit of economic benefit. Since such ac-
tivity would involve direct negotiations and dealings with resi-
dents, the required substantial connection would be present.
C. IHAwsoN v. DENCKIA
Hanson v. Denckla64 made it clear that McGee did not fore-
shadow the end of all territorial restrictions on jurisdiction. In
that case the assertion of jurisdiction by Florida over a Delaware
trust company which had neither transacted nor solicited business
in Florida was held to violate due process.
However, a major question has been left in doubt by the state-
64. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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ment in Hanson that "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus in-
voking the benefits and protection of its laws."' 5 Whether due
process after Hanson requires the defendant to have performed
acts within the boundaies of the forum state is open to con-
jecture; two readings of Hanson are possible.
There is authority for the suggestion that acts must be per-
formed within the forum state0 In McGee, however, due process
was satisfied even though the defendant had performed no act
in the forum state. It may be significant that the Hanson Court
specifically found that the defendant had performed no act in the
forum state, and that, consequently, the defendant had not exer-
cised any privilege in the forum state0 7 It would appear to follow
that the act required by Hanson would be one performed by the
defendant within the forum state. Moreover, the ordinary mean-
ing of the word "activity," contemplates the doing of an act.68 If
such is the case, McGee is inconsistent with Hanson, and has been
tacitly disapproved.
It is not clear, however, that Hanson does require the perform-
ance of some act by the defendant in the forum state. Hanson
neither overruled McGee nor clearly disapproved of its rationale;
it distinguished McGee on the facts. The first distinction was that
in Hanson "the cause of action ... is not one that arises out of an
act done or transaction consummated in the forum State" '69 Al-
though this language clearly suggests that performance of some
act in the forum state is highly relevant, it suggests also that a
transaction consummated in the forum state is sufficient, even if
an act is not performed there. Furthermore, Hanson appears to
65. Id. at 253.
66. In International Shoe the defendant employed about a dozen salesmen
who resided and solicited sales in the forum state. In Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 648 (1950), members of the defendant's association resided
and solicited new members in the forum state. And, in Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Iining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), virtually all of the defendant's activi-
ties were conducted through performance of acts in the forum state. In each
case the defendant had performed numerous acts within the forum state, and
in each case jurisdiction was held to be consistent with due process.
67. See 357 U.S. at 252.
68. "Activity" is defined as "state of action, or quality of being active ...
"Action" is defined as "the act or process of acting or doing; the doing of
something;, the exercise of activity; the exercise of activity by an agent ....
Mmumn -WEBsTr, NEw 1TERATIONAL DIcTIoNAny (2d ed. 1961).
69. 857 U.S. at 251.
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have adopted the requirement of McGee that the contract have
a substantial connection with the forum state. This is suggested
by the fact that Hanson distinguished McGee on the ground that
the agreement in Hanson was entered without such connection. 70
The most significant difference, however, was that in Hanson there
was "no instance in which the trustee performed any acts in
Florida that bear the same relationship to the agreement as the
solicitation in McGee. Consequently, this suit cannot be said to
be one to enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege the
defendant exercised in Florida."7' This language supports the
strong inference that the "act" required by Hanson does not have
to be performed within the borders of the forum state, since the
acts of solicitation by the defendant in McGee were performed
from outside of the forum state. It may be concluded Hanson
recognized that due process does not necessarily require acts
within the forum state. Furthermore, the defendant in Hanson
had exercised no privilege in the forum state as, by implication,
the defendant in McGee had done by soliciting. If this privilege
can be taken as the equivalent of "the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State," 72 it follows that the general
standard of Hanson would be entirely satisfied by the solicitation
in McGee. Thus, the "some act" and the "privilege of conducting
activities" could be one and the same.73 If this is the proper read-
ing of Hanson, it is equivalent to the McGee rationale discussed
above. Whereas McGee required a substantial connection with
the forum state, Hanson required an act by which the defendant
purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum. Hence, the Hanson requirement only defines the sub-
stantial connection demanded by McGee.
Until the Supreme Court indicates which reading of Hanson
it will adopt, the choice must be left to the lower courts. Although
some of the circuits have followed McGee, the defendant has per-
70. Id. at 252.
71. Ibid.
72. Id. at 253.
73. See Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Con-
tractors Ass'n of No. Cal., Inc., 342 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1965); Kourkene v.
American BBR, Inc., 313 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1963); L. D. Reeder Contractors
v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959). The standard was
adopted from Note, 47 GEO. L.J. 342, 351 (1958): "The nonresident defendant
must do some act or consummate some transaction within the forum. It is
not necessary that defendant's agent be physically within the forum, for this
act or transaction may be by mail only."
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:946
formed physical acts within the forum state whenever jurisdiction
has been upheld.7 4
D. TiE VALIDITY OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT AND EIGHTH
CIRCUIT DEcISIONS UNDER THE Two RATIONALES OF Hanson
v. Denckia
Under the reading of Hanson which merely defines the stand-
ard of McGee, the Supreme Court's evaluation of the Minnesota
Supreme Court's requirements in tort cases can be predicted more
confidently than under McGee itself. A defendant dealing directly
with a Minnesota resident is actively seeking a market. In so
acting, it purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state such as solicitation, customer service,
and direct negotiation of sales. Such activities also give rise to
substantial benefits from state laws: The existence of a potential
market is due to a great extent to laws of Minnesota pertaining
to the state's economy; Minnesota courts will enforce claims
against resident customers; and police protection encompasses all
property within the state. Thus, the necessary substantial con-
nection under this Hanson rationale would invariably be present.
When products reach the state without direct connections between
a defendant and either a Minnesota resident or dealer, it is un-
likely that the defendant has performed any act which would
provide a substantial connection with the state. The activities in
Minnesota and the benefits of local law inure directly to the
benefit of the third party to whom the defendant sells its products
outside the state. Although the defendant does indirectly receive
74. In addition to the Ninth Circuit cases, there have been recent deci-
sions in seven other circuits. Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d
861 (5th Cir. 1965); Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir.
1965); Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965); Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Houston Fearless Corp. v.
Teter, 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963); Blount v. Peerless Chemicals (P. R.),
Inc., 316 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963); WSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th
Cir. 1958); W. H. Elliot & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st
Cir. 1957). In each case where jurisdiction has been upheld the defendant had
performed acts within the forum. Deveny followed McGee and concluded that
Hanson in no way increased the requirements which the Court found to be
satisfied in McGee. WSAZ also followed McGee, but the acts performed by
the defendant in the forum state seemed to have substantial significance.
And, as has been stated, Aftanase would not require performance of acts in
the forum state. On the other hand, Houston required substantial, continuous,
and regular activity in the forum state. Thus, the various circuits have used
conflicting rationales, and in those courts which have adopted the McGee
rationale, the question has never really been tested.
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some benefits through its purchaser's market, in no sense can it be
said that the defendant has performed an act by which it was
enabled to conduct activities in Minnesota. Having sold the
product to a customer in some other state, the manufacturer ceases
to be involved with any further resale. Although the defendant
may reasonably expect its product to reach Minnesota, such a
result would be due to activities with which the defendant has no
connection. Therefore, it would seem that the requisite substantial
contact of the defendant would be absent, and an assertion of
personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process under
this Hanson rationale.
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court would at least require
"activity" connected with Minnesota in true contract actions, the
requirements of this Hanson rationale would be more than satis-
fied. McGee might uphold jurisdiction over a nonresident buyer
which had not sought the transaction as in Hilson. But jurisdic-
tion in these circumstances would probably violate due process
under this suggested reading of Hanson. Although the dealings
would be direct, the mere purchase of products from a resident,
where payment is to be remitted to the seller in Minnesota, would
not appear to involve an act by which the purchaser would pur-
posely avail itself of any privilege of conducting activities in that
state.
Since the Eighth Circuit would require active pursuit of eco-
nomic benefits in Minnesota, the demands of this suggested Han-
son rationale would be met. The analysis would be the same as
that used in the discussion of the activities of the defendant seller
dealing directly with state residents.
Under the interpretation of Hanson which does require an act
within the forum, however, there would be some significant differ-
ences. Because the state court in tort actions requires only that
the defendant should reasonably expect its products to reach
Minnesota, the minimum requirements of this Hanson rationale
would not be met. Since warranty without a privity requirement
is strict tort liability, use of that pseudocontractual theory would
have the same result. In contract actions against nonresident pur-
chasers the Minnesota court clearly requires pursuit of some
economic benefit as well as acts performed in Minnesota. How-
ever, it is not clear whether the court would require local acts if
a resident purchaser sued a foreign seller alleging failure of de-
livery. Since the Eighth Circuit would not require the perform-
ance of acts in the forum state, the requirements of the strict
75. See text accompanying notes 26 & 27 supra.
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Hanson rationale would not be met. However, the Supreme Court
might be willing to relax even the strict Hanson standard if the
Eighth Circuit's requirement of substantial economic benefit were
satisfied.
V. THE LIB3ERALIZATION OF DUE PROCESS:
A LOGICAL CULMINATION
The two general requirements of jurisdictional due process,
although firmly entrenched, have undergone substantial trans-
formation. Territorial limitations upon the jurisdictional power
of the states have been considerably relaxed. The requirements of
fairness to the defendant under "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" are more easily met. Whereas Pennoyer v.
Neff" required the physical presence of the defendant within the
forum state, Hanson may not even require the defendant to per-
form acts within the forum state. Nevertheless, it appears that due
process will continue to require some connection between the
defendant and the forum state.77 Although the justification for a
territorial limitation upon state power appears highly elusive,78
some form of the limitation will probably remain essential.
It is possible to satisfy a realistic territorial requirement, with-
out requiring the defendant to have performed any acts within
the borders of the forum. A corporate defendant has substantially
the same contact with a state, whether it deals with residents en-
tirely from without that state, or partially from within it. For in-
stance, if the defendant in McGee had solicited the reinsurance
contract through a salesman physically situated in California, the
transaction would be substantially the same as solicitation con-
ducted by mail. The defendant in either case would have actively
pursued economic benefit from a resident and received the pro-
tection of local law.
"Fair play and substantial justice" require an examination of
convenience. Since bona fide causes of action must be adjudicated
somewhere, one party to the action must suffer the inconvenience
of litigating away from home. There appears to be a great deal of
merit, however, in McGee's intimation that only rarely would
inconvenience be so unfair as to constitute a denial of due process.
Since the plaintiff has the original choice of forum, the defendant
76. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
77. Hanson v. Denclda, 857 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 826 U.S. 310 (1945).
78. Both International Shoe and Hanson accept this requirement without
comment upon its justification.
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would normally bear the inconvenience. It might be argued that
it is unfair to require a corporation to defend a suit arising out
of its acts if it could not have known in advance where it would
be subject to jurisdiction. Since a corporation could not make a
fully informed choice to act or not to act without this knowledge,
fairness might seem to require access to that knowledge.
The concept of foreseeability provides an adequate framework
for analyzing the requirement of fairness and substantial justice.
If a corporation purposely sells its products to residents of a
state, it can weigh the risks of incurring the expense of defending
tort actions arising from defects in its products. Since the choice
would be voluntary, subjecting the corporation to jurisdiction
would not be unfair. Likewise, even if a corporation merely places
its products in the stream of interstate commerce, it can reason-
ably expect that its products may ultimately enter a particular
state.79 It could be argued, however, that a corporation should
not be required to base its decision whether to engage in inter-
state commerce on the uncertainties of distant litigation 9 But
in the rare instances in which the inconvenience created would
be greatly unfair perhaps the most equitable solution would be
to permit suit in the plaintiff's state of residence, subject to the
discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens. Several courts
have taken this approach 8 Apart from product warranty which
79. A manufacturer of component parts sold to the manufacturer of the
finished product, has no control over the product's ultimate destination. How-
ever, there would still be a voluntary choice of whether or not to act, even
though that choice would not be on the tactical level of a specific sale to a
known destination. Rather, it would be on the strategic level of whether to
engage in interstate commerce at all. In making this decision the component
manufacturer could be expected to know the scope of the sales territory of the
finished product.
80. However, the argument that jurisdiction in a particular case may un-
duly burden interstate commerce is readily available. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8(3). See generally Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations As a Burden
on Interstate Commerce, 17 Muur. L. REv. 381 (1933). In a few post-Inter-
national Shoe decisions the commerce clause argument has found favor. Hershel
Radio Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.2d 286 (1952); Hay-
man v. Southern Pac. R.R., 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1955) (alternative ground);
see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956). Contra, Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216, 220 (D.
Minn. 1962). For a recent examination of the commerce clause problem see
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAxv. L. REV. 909,
988-87 (1960), where it is concluded that the commerce clause may operate
to defeat jurisdiction.
81. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964); Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 342, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961).
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really sounds in tort, a corporation contemplating a contract is
always able to exercise some choice whether or not to act. A
corporation could always be aware of the residency of the other
contracting party and could make the tactical decision to deal
or not. Under this analysis, the substantiality of the economic
benefit received by a corporation is irrelevant to due process. The
outer limits of the due process territorial and fairness require-
ments would be reached whenever a corporation's products, sold
in interstate commerce, reach Minnesota, or whenever a corpora-
tion contracts with a Minnesota resident. One product or one con-
tract should be sufficient.
The United States Supreme Court's requirements under McGee
or either reading of Hanson are more restrictive than due process
would seem to demand. Due process need not require activities
by a defendant within the forum state, nor must there be active
pursuit of economic benefit in that state. All that should be neces-
sary under a single act statute is an awareness by a defendant
that one of its products may find its way to a particular state,
or an awareness of the residence of the other party to a single
contract. Having this knowledge, a corporation could be expected
to weigh the potential jurisdictional consequences of its proposed
acts. This result seems more reasonable than requiring a poten-
tial purchaser of a product to balance the expense of a foreign
suit against his desire to purchase the product.2
VI. CONCLUSION
Convenience, state interest, and substantiality of economic
benefit may be relevant to the requirements of due process con-
cerning application of the Minnesota Single Act Statute. But the
two decisive questions are whether the defendant corporation
must perform acts within the territory of the forum and whether
82. The territorial and fairness requirements of due process, as they have
been developed in the preceding analysis, could apply equally to all entities
and all activities. There seems to be no significant basis for distinguishing cor-
porations from individuals; a distinction between economic and noneconomic
activity need not compel different standards of due process. The territorial re-
quirement could be satisfied if a defendant's acts have consequences in the
forum state. A libellous letter written in New York and delivered in Minnesota
may have actionable consequences in the latter. Since the writer could reason-
ably have forseen the effect in Minnesota, the fairness requirement would be
satisfied. Finally, the defendant could invoke the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to protect against gross inconvenience. A more detailed analysis of the
possibility of applying single act statutes to individuals is beyond the scope of
this note.
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it must purposely seek economic benefits through dealings with
local residents. The answers to these questions have been con-
flicting. The Minnesota Supreme Court requires neither in tort
actions under the statute, but requires both in contract actions
apart from the hybrid claim of product warranty. Neither the
United States Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has sug-
gested such a distinction. The Eighth Circuit would probably not
require acts performed in Minnesota but would require pursuit of
economic benefit. The United States Supreme Court clearly re-
quires purposeful pursuit of economic benefits, but it is not at all
clear whether the Court would require the performance of acts in
Minnesota. The Supreme Court has approached the question of
jurisdictional due process rather cautiously. Since the benchmark
of International Shoe, the Court has refined and liberalized its
requirements somewhat hesitantly. Yet, it would appear that
even the liberal position of McGee is by no means the last step.
